Warning: This article contains details about sexual assault & domestic violence which may be upsetting for some readers. Reader discretion is advised.
This case involved an appeal where the respondent relied on a guilty plea to extend a limitation period under section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974.
In issue
- Whether the respondent (B1) could rely upon the guilty plea to 3 counts of rape entered by the appellant (B2) as a ‘material fact of a decisive character’ for the purposes of section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (LAA), in order to extend the limitation period for her battery claim.
The background
B1 and B2 met in 1996 and were married in 1999. B2 was violent towards his wife. In 2001, she was hospitalised to undergo surgery for a condition that she had lived with since birth. On three different occasions, B2 raped B1 in a public toilet at the hospital during that hospitalisation. B1 made a preliminary complaint in 2016. In 2017, she went to the police. B2 pleaded guilty to three counts of rape on indictment in 2021.
In 2022, B1 signed a notice of claim under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (PIPA). She was granted leave pursuant to section 43 of PIPA to commence Court proceedings, which were stayed pending compliance with Chapter 2 Part 1 of PIPA. In September 2022, B1 filed a claim and statement of claim in the District Court, and in March 2023 brought an application in the District Court of Queensland to extend the limitation period pursuant to s 31(2) of the LAA.
Although B1 knew the identify of her assailant (B2) and that she had a cause of action against him, the primary judge granted B1’s application for an extension of the limitation period under section 31 of the LAA, on the basis that B2’s guilty plea was ‘a material fact of a decisive character’.
B2 appealed that decision on the basis that:
- first, his Honour erred in finding that the plea of guilty constituted a material fact, and
- secondly, if it was accepted that the plea of guilty was a material fact, his Honour erred in finding that it was a material fact of a decisive character.
The decision on appeal
The majority of the Queensland Court of Appeal upheld the District Court decision and dismissed B2’s appeal, commenting that:
- B2’s plea of guilty to the 3 rape charges (which was admissible under section 79 of the Evidence Act 1977) did constitute a ‘material fact’ under section 30(1)(a) of the LAA in respect of B1’s claim for battery. In this regard:
- If the guilty plea only enhanced B1’s prospects of success by reducing the possibility of B2 defending the claim, it would not be a ‘material fact’ for the purposes of section 30(1)(a) of the LAA.
- However, in the present claim, B2’s guilty plea was evidence of the acts which were the subject of the action for battery having occurred.
- The material fact (i.e. B2’s guilty plea) was ‘a material fact of a decisive character’. Until the plea of guilty was entered and could be relied upon as an admission, together with the conviction, B1’s case depended on B1’s evidence being accepted. As a result, appropriate advice as to her prospects of success would not realistically have been better than fifty per cent. The plea and subsequent conviction were therefore ‘a material fact of a decisive character’ because they:
- provided independent proof of the acts constituting battery perpetrated by B2,
- were corroborative of the facts known by B1 herself,
- ameliorated the risks of it being a word against word case, and
- increased the prospects of success of the action to make the bringing of proceedings worthwhile.
Implications for you
The decision in this case is an important reminder that even where a claimant has all of the information needed to identify the relevant parties and an appropriate cause of action prior to the last year of the limitation period, the emergence of further evidence may give rise to an entitlement to an extension of the limitation period under section 31 of the LAA. This will be particularly relevant in personal injury claims involving alleged criminal conduct as against the claimant.