Barbara O'Toole's psychiatric injury claim against BlueCare was dismissed due to expired limitation period, highlighting the importance of timely legal action in personal injury cases.
In issue
- The primary issue in dispute was whether the medical opinion provided by the Tribunal constituted a material fact of a decisive character that was not within the applicant’s knowledge (as those terms are defined in section 30 of LAA) until after the limitation period expired. The respondent opposed the application, arguing that sufficient information was available to the applicant before the limitation period expired, and that she had legal advice early on to pursue a common law claim.
The background
Barbara O'Toole (the applicant) was employed as an adviser for BlueCare (the respondent). The applicant alleged that she suffered a psychiatric injury over a period of time between April 2019 and 26 August 2020 during the course of her employment. Following the lodgment of her application for workers’ compensation on 10 February 2021, the applicant was working but did not return to the full extent of her pre-injury role. The applicant eventually ceased work altogether on 23 June 2023 due to psychiatric injuries.
The applicant alleged that:
- Upon initially ceasing work in June 2023, her treating practitioners were optimistic that she would be able to return to work with treatment.
- The final opinion of the Mental Assessment Tribunal (the Tribunal) opined that her capacity to undertake any form of paid employment in the future had been extinguished or at least significantly reduced.
- The applicant was not aware of the impact of her injuries on her future earning capacity until receipt of the Tribunal decision on 9 April 2024.
Accordingly, the applicant sought to extend the limitation period to commence an action for damages for personal injury against the respondent pursuant to section 31 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (LAA), on the basis that the Tribunal decision contained a ‘material fact of a decisive character’ (i.e. that her future earning capacity was diminished) not known to her until after the ordinary limitation period had expired.
The decision
While his Honour accepted that the final opinion of the Tribunal was considered material by the applicant, his Honour held that:
- The bare and essential ingredients of the cause of action were known to the applicant prior to the expiry of the ordinary limitation period.
- The applicant (or her legal representative) was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the extent of the applicant’s condition impacting upon her employability.
- The final opinion of the Tribunal was not a necessary fact to prove the material facts for a cause of action.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the statements of opinion expressed in the Tribunal did not meet the definition of ‘a material fact of a decisive character’ as defined under section 30 of the LAA. The applicant’s application was dismissed.
Implications for you
This decision highlights that in order to succeed in an application for an extension of time made under section 31 of the LAA, the applicant must be able to establish that the additional information identified as the ‘material fact’ was not already within the applicant’s means of knowledge.
O'Toole v BlueCare ATF the Uniting Church in Aust. Property Trust (Q) [2025] QDC 93
