Suppression of a clinician’s identity: a comparison between the United Kingdom and Australia

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18 September 2025

Background to Abassi & Haastrup

Abassi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation

Ms Zainab Abbasi (Zainab) was born in 2013 at the NHS Foundation Trust Hospital (NHS Hospital). Following her birth, Zainab was diagnosed with a rare and profoundly disabling neurodegenerative disease, and later, lung damage, as a result of contracting swine flu.³ For most of Zainab’s life, she received palliative care from the NHS Hospital. Her parents, who were also medically qualified, frequently disagreed with Zainab’s care and after some time, the relationship between the NHS Hospital and Zainab’s parents deteriorated.⁴

In 2019, the NHS Hospital issued proceedings seeking a declaration that it would be in Zainab’s best interests that life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn.⁵ Zainab was a respondent to the proceedings with her parents and a Court Support Service acting as litigation guardians. From the outset of proceedings, the NHS Hospital applied for an embargo on all information capable of identifying any persons or institutions involved in Zainab’s care via an injunction.⁶ The application for injunction sought an order prohibiting the publishing or broadcasting of any information capable of identifying Zainab, her family members or the personal details of any medical staff involved in Zainab’s care.⁷ The NHS Hospital, in their application, expressed that in recent matters before the court where withdrawal of life-preserving treatment was considered, medical staff were exposed to harassment. Citing the decision of Evans v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust,⁸ the NHS Hospital explained that social media groups would be set up which subjected medical staff to verbal abuse online.⁹ Further, the NHS Hospital explained that in some instances, protests outside the Hospital would be organised, causing staff to suffer anxiety and distress which would negatively affect the care given to Zainab.¹⁰ The injunction was granted without opposition and was to be in effect following the conclusion of proceedings or until further orders.

The injunction was to be reviewed at the main hearing in addition to a determination of withdrawal of treatment from Zainab. Unfortunately, Zainab died 3 days before the full hearing; the injunction remained active despite Zainab having died.¹¹

Haastrup v Kings College Hospital

Mr Isaiah Haastrup (Isaiah), was born in February 2017 at the King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust (King’s Hospital). During his birth, due to clinical negligence, Isaiah suffered oxygen deprivation, causing damage to his central nervous system. Following Isaiah’s birth, he was permanently dependent upon a ventilator to sustain his life.¹²

In August 2017, the King’s Hospital made an application seeking a declaration that withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment was in Isaiah’s best interests. Isaiah was named as a respondent to the proceedings with his parents and the Court Support Service acting as a litigation guardian.¹³ Similar to the matter of Abassi, the King’s Hospital applied for an embargo on all information capable of identifying any staff involved in Isaiah’s care. The injunction was to prohibit the name and/or personal details of all medical staff involved in Isaiah’s care any pictures or other material likely to lead to the identification of medical staff or Isaiah.¹⁴ The injunction was sought on identical grounds as in Abassi. On 6 October 2017, the injunction was granted and was to remain in effect until further ordered. In January 2018, the matter proceeded to full hearing where a determination was made that life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn. On 7 March 2018, Isaiah died.¹⁵

Isaiah’s case was the subject of national media coverage between February and May 2018 with a Coronial inquest focusing on the circumstances of Isaiah’s birth.¹⁶ Isaiah’s parents wished to publicly speak about the matter, though the injunction prevented them from identifying clinicians who they sought to critique.¹⁷

Initial appeal actions

First application to discharge injunction

In August 2020, the parents of Zainab and Isaiah made applications for discharge of the injunctions prohibiting the identification of medical clinicians.¹⁸ Zainab’s parents argued it was within the public interest to discuss Zainab’s case and criticise individuals involved in her care (which they considered would substantiate the allegations they wished to make). The parents of Isaiah wished to speak openly about the matter and for media to be able to report on the circumstances and those involved.¹⁹

In response to the application for discharge, both the NHS Hospital and the King’s Hospital (collectively, Hospitals) made cross-applications that new injunctions be granted in the same terms as the previous injunctions and on the same bases.²⁰ In particular, the Hospitals argued that if their staff were identified, they would be subject to abuse from social media groups or protests outside their respective Hospitals. Further, the Hospitals argued that the risk of medical staff being exposed to abuse would disrupt the quality-of-care medical staff would be able to provide to their patients.²¹ To advance their cross-application, the Hospitals cited previous caselaw and referred to Facebook pages being set up regarding both Zainab and Isaiah.²²

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications made by both Zainab and Isaiah’s parents.²³ The Court of Appeal held that it had a duty to act in accordance with the European Convention of Human Rights (Convention) and balance Art 8 of the Convention against Art 10 of the Convention.²⁴ Article 8 of the Convention states that there must be “respect for [a persons] private and family life”.²⁵ Article 10 states that everyone has “the right to freedom of expression [and] this right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority”.²⁶ Based on the evidence that the Court of Appeal received, it favoured prioritising Art 8 rights. The court explained that the abuse clinical staff would receive would likely be detrimental to their mental health and wellbeing. Further, there would be detriment to, recruitment, retention and encouraging staff to specialise.²⁷

High Court Appeal

The parents of Zainab and Isaiah then appealed to the High Court, again citing public interest as a basis for appeal. The High Court allowed the appeal.²⁸

The primary findings in the High Court decision were as follows:

The High Court had jurisdiction to make, vary or discharge injunctions restraining publicity during the proceedings of any kind.
In regard to Zainab and Isaiah, the significant passage of time following their deaths greatly reduced the risk of abuse or harassment of the clinical staff if their identities were revealed. Further, concerns regarding the recruitment of new doctors or fears that staff would not choose to specialise were not appropriate considerations in the balancing of freedom of privacy rights as against freedom of speech rights.
The risk of invasion to a clinician’s privacy “came nowhere near” justifying a continued impediment to a parent’s right to discuss the catastrophic injuries sustained by their child.²⁹

The Supreme Court Appeal

The Hospitals sought to appeal the High Court’s determination on the basis that clinicians would be at risk of harm should their names be publicly revealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the Hospitals’ appeal. In making its decision, the court explained the jurisdiction and function of its parens patriae power. Second, the court explained at what point parties would be discharged from an injunction. Finally, the court explained alternatives for clinicians fearful of their involvement in catastrophic injury being publicised.

Jurisdiction and function of the parens patriae power

In sensitive matters where the court is called on to make decisions affecting the rights of a child, it may use the prerogative parens patriae power. The parens patriae power, as defined by the court, is where the court has a jurisdiction to act for those who cannot protect themselves; in this instance, a severely disabled child.³⁰

The parens patriae power, inter alia, empowers the court to grant injunctions restraining publication of information, if necessary, to protect the interests of a child.³¹ For the purposes of litigation, the interests of a child are enshrined in Art 8 of the Convention. As above, Art 8 of the Convention relevantly provides that a person (or child) has a right to privacy and confidentiality.³² Accordingly, in matters where withdrawal of life-preserving treatment is considered, the court may approve injunctions which prevent the publication of information identifying the child, the care they receive or the details of their parents.³³

The court explained the jurisdiction to protect the interests of a child can also extend to restraining publication of information identifying clinicians involved in that child’s care.³⁴ If concerns are raised about clinicians being subjected to abuse or threats of harm, the court may extend an injunction to restrain identification of staff involved in a child’s care. The court, citing the case of Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority v Robinson,³⁵ explained:

…if it can be shown an activity is taking place outside the hospital the court may, if appropriate, grant an injunction to restrain that activity if it is an activity which can be shown to be having a sufficiently significant impact on the security of the hospital or the treatment…³⁶

The court had also cited Re C (a Minor) (No 2) saying that:

…those who have the charge of [an injured baby] have … a task which is sufficiently difficult and emotionally draining without the pressures on them … the promotion of [an injured babies] welfare requires that those caring for [them] should not have to cope with [the] additional burden [of massive personal publicity].³⁷

The court, indicated that in circumstances of high publicity, medical staff may have difficulty in carrying out their functions as there is a risk of harm to them.³⁸ As such, the court held that the initial imposition of the injunction preventing publication of any information regarding both Zainab and Isaiah was appropriate. The court was satisfied that, in its parens patriae jurisdiction, an injunction was granted to protect the interests of Zainab and Isaiah.³⁹

Discharge from injunctions restraining publication

The court explained that once an injunction has been granted, the court will retain the jurisdiction to consider applications to discharge or vary the injunction.⁴⁰ After a child has died, the parens patriae jurisdiction, to protect the interests of a child, can no longer justify the continuation of an injunction.⁴¹ Given the primary purpose of the injunction was to act in the best interests of a child while the court determines if life-preserving treatment should be withdrawn, after a child dies, the purpose of the injunction falls away. The court explained that following the death of a child, an injunction preventing publication of information would remain in place for a “cooling off” period to enable parties to consider making applications to continue the injunction for the court to consider.⁴²

The court otherwise held that following the death of a child, parties will be discharged from injunctions and free to discuss the details as they wish.⁴³

Clinician application for continuance of injunction

The continuation of injunctions preventing publication may be sought in order to protect clinicians who treated children who are the subject of withdrawal of life-preserving treatment applications.⁴⁴ Throughout these proceedings, the court was unable to hear an application from the Hospitals regarding the protection of the identity of clinicians themselves. The court explained that, absent a clinician’s application, they could not balance their rights as against those subject to an injunction. Further, little if anything would be known about the individual clinician’s reasons for wishing to have the injunction remain.⁴⁵ Accordingly, the court expressed its view that, should a clinician wish to assert their rights, they must bring their own application for continuation of the injunction.⁴⁶ After the end of any cooling off period, and should a clinician wish to apply for continuation, they must explain why they require protection for a significantly longer period.⁴⁷ In doing so, the court must be satisfied that an application for continuation is prescribed by law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and for, inter alia, the protection of their reputation.⁴⁸ Further, the court must be satisfied that after a significant period of time following the death of a child, a risk to the clinician remains.⁴⁹

Australia’s position on clinician protection

In Australia, the courts have demonstrated a reluctance to grant suppression orders. In his paper on Non Publication and Suppression Orders, his Honour Applegath J noted that a court should only exercise a power to restrict publication of a report of proceedings if the restriction is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice in those proceedings.⁵⁰ Within Australia, and within a civil context, each state has legislative provisions which set out when it is appropriate to restrict publication. In South Australia (and noting that each state and territory has corresponding provisions), grants of suppression are governed by s 69A of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (Act).⁵¹ The Act relevantly provides that for a suppression order to be granted, a person must satisfy the court that grant of suppression would:

prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, or
prevent undue hardship -
- to an alleged victim of crime,
- to a witness or potential witness in civil or criminal proceedings who is not a party to those proceedings, or
- to a child.⁵²

The legislative thresholds for a grant of suppression are high as confirmed in the recent decision of Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Belperio (No 2).⁵³ In this case, the South Australian Supreme Court was asked to grant a suppression order supressing the identity of a barrister the subject of misconduct investigation allegations involving sexual harassment.⁵⁴ In dismissing the application, the court confirmed that there are only confined circumstances where a suppression would be made under s 69A(a) (the proper administration of justice), and that the interests of justice were best served by open conduct of proceedings.⁵⁵ The court considered that to conceal allegations against a practitioner which question an entitlement to practice would be no small order.⁵⁶ Further, the public would likely wish to consider the basis of the questions brought against a practitioner before entering into a relationship with them.⁵⁷ The court noted that hardship in the nature of public embarrassment or reputational risk is an inherent consequence of charging a person with allegations of misconduct that must be tried by a court.⁵⁸

Comparison between UK and Australia

Medical practitioners, as parties to litigation, do not enjoy any distinction from other persons in terms of suppression orders. In Australia, the overarching consideration will always be whether the order is necessary to ensure the proper administration of justice. Considerations of career reputational risk or personal privacy will not weigh heavily into a court’s deliberation as they do in the UK, as the cases of Abasssi and Haastrup demonstrate. Where a clinician can adequately demonstrate these risks, a UK court is more inclined to make a grant of suppression insofar as it involves the particular clinician. The position is different in Australia. In Australia, advancing an argument that suppression should be granted on the basis of reputational risk or privacy is unlikely to displace the principle of open justice and for justice not only to be done but to be seen to be done.⁵⁹

¹ Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney v Kondrajian (2001) NSWCA 308; BC200105805 at [64].
² Abbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust; Haastrup v King’s College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2025] UKSC 15.³ Above n 2, at [9].⁴ Above.⁵ Above n 2, at [10].⁶ Above. Within Australia, a recent example of a suppression order was canvassed by Applegarth J in R v O’Demspey (No 3) [2017] QSC 338:

… until further order, the name of the witness who gave evidence […] and any matter which is likely to lead to the identification of the witness [is] not to be published to the public [or a section of the public] by any means, including publication in a book, newspaper, magazine or other written publication, by being broadcast by radio or television or any other form of electronic means of communication or by being disseminated by social media. [The Hon Justice Peter Applegarth AM speech delivered at the Queensland Magistrates’ State Conference 2024, Friday 24 May 2024].

⁷ Above n 2, at [22].
⁸ Above; see also Great Ormon Street Hospital for Children NHS Foundation Trust v Yates (No 2) [2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam); Evans v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust [2018] EWCA Civ 805.⁹ Above n 2, at [32].¹⁰ Above.¹¹ Above n 2, at [12].¹² Above n 2, at [14].¹³ Above n 2, at [15].¹⁴ Above n 2, at [27].
¹⁵ Above n 2, at [17].¹⁶ Above n 2, at [30].¹⁷ Above n 2, at [19].¹⁸ Above n 2, at [29].¹⁹ Above.²⁰ Above n 2, at [31].²¹ Above n 2, at [10].²² Above n 2, at [34].²³ Above n 2, at [35].²⁴ Above n 2, at [36].²⁵ European Convention on Human Rights, Art 8.²⁶ European Convention on Human Rights, Art 10.²⁷ Above n 2, at [36(3)].²⁸ Above.²⁹ Above n 2, at [36(3)].³⁰ Above n 2, at [56].³¹ Above n 2, at [57].³² European Convention on Human Rights, Art 8.³³ Above n 2, at [60].³⁴ Above.³⁵ Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority v Robinson [2000] QB 775 .³⁶ Above n 2, at [67].³⁷ Above n 2, at [60]; see also Re C (a minor) (No 2) [1990] Fam 39.³⁸ Above n 2, at [65].³⁹ Above n 2, at [62]–[66].⁴⁰ Above n 2, at [102].⁴¹ Above n 2, at [103].⁴² Above.⁴³ Above n 2, at [103].⁴⁴ Above n 2, at [106].⁴⁵ Above.⁴⁶ Above n 2, at [106].⁴⁷ Above n 2, at [66].⁴⁸ Above n 2, at [128].⁴⁹ Above n 2, at [78].⁵⁰ The Honourable Justice P Applegarth AM “Non-Publication and Suppression Orders” (Speech delivered at the Queensland Magistrates’ State Conference 2024,
Queensland (24 May 2024) [5] and [6].⁵¹ Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (SA Evidence Act), ss 69A and 20F; Court Suppression and Non Publication Order Act 2010 (NSW), s 8; Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (ACT), s 8; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), s 103ZZY; Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld), s 7B.⁵² SA Evidence Act, s 69A(a)–(b)(iii).⁵³ Legal Profession Conduct Commissioner v Belperio (No 2) [2024] SASCA 133; BC202416918.⁵⁴ Above, at [150].⁵⁵ Above n 54, at [27].⁵⁶ Above n 54, at [71].⁵⁷ Above.⁵⁸ Above n 54, at [163].⁵⁹ Above n 54, at [16]; see also at [71].

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